

Lessons & Considerations for HCC Response to a Hospital Cyber Event

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**NATIONAL HEALTHCARE COALITION
PREPAREDNESS CONFERENCE**

*Visions of Progress: Sustainable Strategies for
Emergency Preparedness & Resilience*

Presented By:



MESH

December 19, 2023

- IT discovered an outside disruption to computer operations
- IT pulled the plug and shut down ALL operations
- This included not just the hospital, but all the clinics and Urgent Care
- Incident Command was initiated, downtime procedures announced
- All Leadership notified to meet for briefing
- Leadership briefed
- Liberty Hospital went Out of Service via EMResource

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Immediate Objectives

- Ensure Safe Patient Care
- Establish Department Communications
- Triage all patients for possible transfer
- Go “Out of Service” for all ambulances



Local and Regional Assistance

- HCC Duty Officer reached out and a Threat Assessment Team (TAT) Call initiated
- Steve Hoeger (HCC Chair) from University Health came to Liberty Hospital to provide Incident Management support in IC
- Hospital Bed Poll done
- EMS notified of the need to transfer patients
- Liberty Fire dispatched 2 assistant chiefs (Chris Young, Pete VanNess)
- Chief Dan Manley activated the Region A Mutual Aid system, 2 strike teams sent



| Non-Urg 12-21 | MRN | Received for Trans. | Ready | Mode of Trans. | Time left |
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| Urgent | MRN | Received for Trans. | Ready | Mode of Trans. | Time left |
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| 12-22 | 235 | | | | |
| 12-22 | 235 | | | | |
| 12-22 | 237 | OT | | | |

| DATE | CENSUS | ADMITS | TX | DC | ISO |
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BUREAU

HR

Blue folder

Black folder

White folder

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State and Federal Help

Missouri Hospital Association (MHA)

Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS)

Missouri Behavioral Health Strike Team

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Transfer of Patients

Physicians made rounds in house and decided who needed transfer

Patients were triaged as emergent, urgent, or non-urgent

A total of 48 patients were transferred

There were 8 different EMS agencies and 8 different hospitals involved in transfers




Incident Command (IC)

- Core group of leaders staffed IC 24/7 for the first 2 weeks
- IT staffed a representative in IC to triage IT issues
- Daily briefings were held for leadership (sometimes twice a day)
- Primary IC was for operational issues – remained a physical location for 1 month
- Secondary IC was in IT, prioritizing systems restoration
- Incident Command formally demobilized 5 weeks after event





Incident Command Core Group



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Piles and Piles of Paper!



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Life Without Electronics

- Every laptop, desktop, iPad, etc. needed to be screened and reimaged
- Unable to read radiology images as they are all digital
- Phones were cleared in 24 hours, so only used radios a short time
- The only way to mass communicate was via RAVE
- No EHR (Electronic Health Record), no Email



Systems Slowly Restored

- The Emergency Department opened to ambulances 3 days later but remained on TCD diversion
- The EHR was restored 3 weeks after event
- The Emergency Department went off TCD diversion when EHR was restored
- Email was restored one month after event
- Systems have been restored



Lessons Learned

Accept help when offered

Be transparent with leadership and staff

The Kansas City Healthcare Coalition is an invaluable asset

Onsite print shop was a tremendous help

Keep a back-up for policies/procedures/order sets

Make frequent rounds to bolster morale and reassure patients

Have a printed list of leadership & physician cell phone numbers

Communicate, Communicate, Communicate!

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Lessons Learned

JIT Training for
Physicians

Assign super-users
for downtime
documentation

Consistent
leadership in
Incident Command

IT Liaison in
Incident Command

Have multiple
ways to update
staff and public

Arrange for
Critical Incident
Stress
Management

Demobilize in
Phases

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Questions?

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